Abstract:
Incentive compatibility is a central concept in auction theory, and a desirable property of auction mechanisms. In a celebrated result, Aggarwal, Goel and Motwani [2] presented the first truthful deterministic auction for sponsored search (i.e., in a setting where multiple distinct slots are auctioned). Stochastic auctions present several advantages over deterministic ones, as they are less prone to strategic bidding, and increase the diversity of the winning bidders. Meek, Chickering and Wilson [10] presented a family of truthful stochastic auctions for multiple identical items. We present the first class of incentive compatible stochastic auctions for the sponsored search setting. This class subsumes as special cases the laddered auctions of [2] and the stochastic auctions with the condex pricing rule of [10], consolidating these two seemingly disconnected mechanisms in a single framework. Moreover, when the price per click depends deterministically on the bids the auctions in this class are unique. Accordingly, we give a precise characterization of all truthful auctions for sponsored search, in terms of the expected price that each bidder will pay per click. We also introduce randomized algorithms and pricing rules to derive, given an allocation mechanism for the single- or multiple-identical-slots scenarios, a new mechanism for the multislot framework with distinct slots. These extensions have direct practical applications. © 2008 IEEE.
Registro:
| Documento: |
Conferencia
|
| Título: | Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search |
| Autor: | Feuerstein, E.; Heiber, P.A.; Mydlarz, M. |
| Ciudad: | Vila Velha, Espirito Santo |
| Filiación: | Depto. de Computatión, FCEyN, Univ. de Buenos, Aires, Argentina
Yahoo Research, Santiago, Chile
|
| Idioma: |
Inglés
|
| Palabras clave: | Costs; Random processes; Allocation mechanisms; Auction mechanisms; Auction theories; Incentive compatibilities; Incentive compatible; New mechanisms; Pricing rules; Randomized algorithms; Strategic biddings; Commerce |
| Año: | 2008
|
| Número de artículo: | 4756160
|
| Página de inicio: | 39
|
| Página de fin: | 48
|
| DOI: |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LA-WEB.2008.17 |
| Título revista: | Proceedings of the Latin American Web Conference, LA-WEB 2008
|
| Título revista abreviado: | Proc. Latin Am. Web Conf., LA-WEB
|
| Registro: | https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein |
Referencias:
- Abrams, Z., Ghosh, A., Auctions with revenue guarantees for sponsored search (2007) 16th International World Wide Web Conference (WWW2007)
- Aggarwal, G., Goel, A., Motwani, R., Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords (2006) ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 1-7
- Borgs, C., Chayes, J., Etesami, O., Immorlica, N., Jain, K., Mahdian, M., Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions (2007) 16th International World Wide Web Conference (WWW2007)
- Bullow, J., Klemperer, P., Auctions vs. negotiations (1996) American Economic Review, 86, pp. 180-194
- B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz. Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1917 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=861164, 2005Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P., Martínez-Viademonte, J., Baeza-Yates, R., New stochastic algorithms for placing ads in sponsored search (2007) Proc. 5th Latin American Web Congress (LA-WEB 2007)
- Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Karlin, A., Saks, M., Wright, A., Competitive auctions (2006) Games and Economic Behavior
- Holmstrom, B., Groves' scheme on restricted domains (1979) Econometrica, 47 (5), pp. 1137-1144
- Klemperer, P., Auction theory: A guide to the literature (1999) Journal of Economic Surveys, 13 (3), pp. 227-286
- Meek, C., Chickering, D., Wilson, D., Stochastic and contingent-payment auctions (2005) Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions - ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'05)
- Myerson, R., Optimal auction design (1981) Mathematics of Operations Research, 6, pp. 58-73
- Pandey, S., Olston, C., Handling advertisements of unknown quality in search advertising (2006) Proc. Twentieth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), , Vancouver, Canada
- Penemberg, A., Click fraud threatens web (2004) Wired news, , October 13
- Vickrey, W., Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders (1961) The Journal of Finance, 16 (1), pp. 8-37
Citas:
---------- APA ----------
Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P.A. & Mydlarz, M.
(2008)
. Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search. Proceedings of the Latin American Web Conference, LA-WEB 2008, 39-48.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LA-WEB.2008.17---------- CHICAGO ----------
Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P.A., Mydlarz, M.
"Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search"
. Proceedings of the Latin American Web Conference, LA-WEB 2008
(2008) : 39-48.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LA-WEB.2008.17---------- MLA ----------
Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P.A., Mydlarz, M.
"Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search"
. Proceedings of the Latin American Web Conference, LA-WEB 2008, 2008, pp. 39-48.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LA-WEB.2008.17---------- VANCOUVER ----------
Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P.A., Mydlarz, M. Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search. Proc. Latin Am. Web Conf., LA-WEB. 2008:39-48.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LA-WEB.2008.17