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Abstract:

This paper explores the determinants of federal grants allocation across provincial states in Argentina. Our analysis suggests that the redistributive pattern implicit in the federal system of intergovernmental grants cannot be explained on normative grounds exclusively. In order to understand the rationale behind federal grants distribution, a positive approach could render better results. Specifically, we claim that the distribution of federal grants could be associated with political variables such as the political representation of jurisdictions at Congress. The econometric analysis suggests that the significant disparity observed in the per capita representation across different provinces is an important factor explaining the allocation of those transfers. In this respect, overrepresented provinces, both at the senate and at the lower chamber, have received, on average, higher resources from the national government compared to more populous and less represented states. These results are consistent with those observed in other countries.

Registro:

Documento: Artículo
Título:Political determinants of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Argentina
Autor:Porto, A.; Sanguinetti, P.
Filiación:Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Mĩones 2157, 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Universidad Nacional de La Plato, Argentina
Palabras clave:capital provision; federal system; political economy; Argentina
Año:2001
Volumen:13
Número:3
Página de inicio:237
Página de fin:256
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00092
Título revista:Economics and Politics
Título revista abreviado:Econ. Polit.
ISSN:09541985
Registro:https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_09541985_v13_n3_p237_Porto

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Citas:

---------- APA ----------
Porto, A. & Sanguinetti, P. (2001) . Political determinants of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Argentina. Economics and Politics, 13(3), 237-256.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00092
---------- CHICAGO ----------
Porto, A., Sanguinetti, P. "Political determinants of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Argentina" . Economics and Politics 13, no. 3 (2001) : 237-256.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00092
---------- MLA ----------
Porto, A., Sanguinetti, P. "Political determinants of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Argentina" . Economics and Politics, vol. 13, no. 3, 2001, pp. 237-256.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00092
---------- VANCOUVER ----------
Porto, A., Sanguinetti, P. Political determinants of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Argentina. Econ. Polit. 2001;13(3):237-256.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00092