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Abstract:

According to reputation models of sovereign debt, the incentives to repay are proportional to the income insurance benefits provided by the access to international markets. This paper, however, documents that private net lending to developing countries exhibits a procyclical or acyclical pattern, contradicting this premise. By contrast, official debt net flows exhibit a countercyclical patter. In addition, the paper shows that (both current and past) defaults are associated with lower net debt flows. The findings suggest that, while reputation models may explain the preferred creditor status enjoyed by official lenders, they cannot account for the presence of sovereign debt markets in developing countries. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008.

Registro:

Documento: Artículo
Título:Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries
Autor:Yeyati, E.L.
Filiación:Research Department of the Inter-American Development Bank, School of Business, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and Barclays Capital, Miñones 2177, 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Palabras clave:Capital flows; Debt default; Sovereign debt; capital flow; capital market; credit provision; debt; developing world; insurance system; investment incentive; lending behavior; numerical model
Año:2009
Volumen:20
Número:4
Página de inicio:489
Página de fin:507
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11079-008-9086-4
Título revista:Open Economies Review
Título revista abreviado:Open Econ. Rev.
ISSN:09237992
Registro:https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_09237992_v20_n4_p489_Yeyati

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Citas:

---------- APA ----------
(2009) . Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries. Open Economies Review, 20(4), 489-507.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11079-008-9086-4
---------- CHICAGO ----------
Yeyati, E.L. "Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries" . Open Economies Review 20, no. 4 (2009) : 489-507.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11079-008-9086-4
---------- MLA ----------
Yeyati, E.L. "Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries" . Open Economies Review, vol. 20, no. 4, 2009, pp. 489-507.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11079-008-9086-4
---------- VANCOUVER ----------
Yeyati, E.L. Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries. Open Econ. Rev. 2009;20(4):489-507.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11079-008-9086-4