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Abstract:

We construct a general equilibrium model to evaluate the quantitative effects of severance payments in the presence of contractual and reallocational frictions. Key elements of the model are establishment level dynamics, imperfect insurance markets, and variable search decisions. In contrast to previous studies that analyzed severance payments in frictionless environments, we find that severance payments can have large positive effects on employment and welfare. This result is a consequence of search being costly and of wage contracts being rigid. Moreover, we find that the firing penalty role of severance payments is much more important than their insurance role. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.

Registro:

Documento: Artículo
Título:Severance payments in an economy with frictions
Autor:Alvarez, F.; Veracierto, M.
Filiación:Department of Economics, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, United States
Universidad Torcuato di Tella, (1428), Buenos Aires, Argentina
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States
Research Department, Fed. Reserve Bank Chicago, S. L., Chicago, IL 60604, United States
Palabras clave:E24; J64; J65; J66; Search; Severance payments; Unemployment insurance
Año:2001
Volumen:47
Número:3
Página de inicio:477
Página de fin:498
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00058-7
Título revista:Journal of Monetary Economics
Título revista abreviado:J. Monet. Econ.
ISSN:03043932
CODEN:JMOED
Registro:https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_03043932_v47_n3_p477_Alvarez

Referencias:

  • Alvarez, F., Veracierto, M., (1998) Search, Self-insurance and Job-security Provisions, , Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago WP-98-2
  • Anderson, P., Meyer, B., (1993) The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Benefits on Layoffs Using Firm and Individual Data, , Northwestern University
  • Blank, R.M., Card, D., (1988) Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment: Is There An Explanation?, , Princeton University
  • Bentolila, S., Bertola, G., Firing cost and labour demand: How bad is eurosclerosis? (1990) Review of Economic Studies, 57, pp. 381-402
  • Davis, S., Haltiwanger, J., Gross job creation and destruction: microeconomic evidence and macroeconomic implications (1990) NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 5, pp. 123-168
  • Hopenhayn, H., Rogerson, R., Job turnover and policy evaluation: A general equilibrium analysis (1993) Journal of Political Economy, 101, pp. 915-938
  • Lazear, E., Job security provisions and employment (1990) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, pp. 699-726
  • Meyer, B., Unemployment insurance and unemployment spells (1990) Econometrica, 58, pp. 757-782
  • Millard, S., Mortensen, D., (1994) The Unemployment and Welfare Effects of Labour Market Policy: A Comparison of the U.S. and the U.K. Northwestern University
  • Veracierto, M., Employment flows, capital mobility and policy analysis (2001) International Economic Review, , forthcoming

Citas:

---------- APA ----------
Alvarez, F. & Veracierto, M. (2001) . Severance payments in an economy with frictions. Journal of Monetary Economics, 47(3), 477-498.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00058-7
---------- CHICAGO ----------
Alvarez, F., Veracierto, M. "Severance payments in an economy with frictions" . Journal of Monetary Economics 47, no. 3 (2001) : 477-498.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00058-7
---------- MLA ----------
Alvarez, F., Veracierto, M. "Severance payments in an economy with frictions" . Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 47, no. 3, 2001, pp. 477-498.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00058-7
---------- VANCOUVER ----------
Alvarez, F., Veracierto, M. Severance payments in an economy with frictions. J. Monet. Econ. 2001;47(3):477-498.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00058-7