Artículo

Feuerstein, E.; Heiber, P.A.; Lopez-Rosenfeld, M.; Mydlarz, M. "Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search" (2009) 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management, AAIM 2009. 5564 LNCS:188-201
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Abstract:

Most sponsored search auctions use the Generalized Second Price (GSP) rule. Given the GSP rule, they try to give an optimal allocation, an easy task when the only need is to allocate ads to slots. However, when other practical conditions must be fulfilled -such as budget constraints, exploration of the performance of new ads, etc.- optimal allocations are hard to obtain. We provide a method to optimally allocate ads to slots under the practical conditions mentioned above. Our auctions are stochastic, and can be applied in tandem with different pricing rules, among which we highlight two: an intuitive generalization of GSP and VCG payments. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Registro:

Documento: Artículo
Título:Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search
Autor:Feuerstein, E.; Heiber, P.A.; Lopez-Rosenfeld, M.; Mydlarz, M.
Ciudad:San Francisco, CA
Filiación:Departamento de Computación, FCEyN, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Yahoo Research, Santiago, Chile
Palabras clave:Budget constraint; Optimal allocation; Optimal auction; Pricing rules; Sponsored search auctions; Optimization; Commerce
Año:2009
Volumen:5564 LNCS
Página de inicio:188
Página de fin:201
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02158-9_17
Título revista:5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management, AAIM 2009
Título revista abreviado:Lect. Notes Comput. Sci.
ISSN:03029743
Registro:https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_03029743_v5564LNCS_n_p188_Feuerstein

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Citas:

---------- APA ----------
Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P.A., Lopez-Rosenfeld, M. & Mydlarz, M. (2009) . Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search. 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management, AAIM 2009, 5564 LNCS, 188-201.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02158-9_17
---------- CHICAGO ----------
Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P.A., Lopez-Rosenfeld, M., Mydlarz, M. "Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search" . 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management, AAIM 2009 5564 LNCS (2009) : 188-201.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02158-9_17
---------- MLA ----------
Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P.A., Lopez-Rosenfeld, M., Mydlarz, M. "Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search" . 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management, AAIM 2009, vol. 5564 LNCS, 2009, pp. 188-201.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02158-9_17
---------- VANCOUVER ----------
Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P.A., Lopez-Rosenfeld, M., Mydlarz, M. Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 2009;5564 LNCS:188-201.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02158-9_17