Abstract:
The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of acting selfishly and that agents acting selfishly will increase their belief that others are also selfish. In this work, we posit a mathematical model of these mechanisms and explain their impact on the undermining of a global cooperative society. We simulate the behavior of agents playing a prisoner’s dilemma game in a random network of contacts. We endow each agent with these two self-deception mechanisms which bias her toward thinking that the other agent will defect. We study behavior when a fraction of agents with the “always defect” strategy is introduced in the network. Depending on the magnitude of the biases the players could start a cascade of defection or isolate the defectors. We find that there are thresholds above which the system approaches a state of complete distrust. © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Registro:
Documento: |
Artículo
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Título: | Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception |
Autor: | Babino, A.; Makse, H.A.; DiTella, R.; Sigman, M. |
Filiación: | Departamento de Física J.J. Giambiagi, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1428, Argentina Instituto de Física de Buenos Aires, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Buenos Aires, 1428, Argentina Levich Institute, City College of New York, New York, NY 10031, United States Physics Department, City College of New York, New York, NY 10031, United States Political Economy Group, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States Social Interactions, Identity and Well-being Program, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada Government and the International Economy Unit, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, United States Laboratorio de Neurociencia, CONICET, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, C1428BIJ, Argentina
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Palabras clave: | Behavioral economics; Cognitive neuroscience; Cooperation; Corruption; Self-deception; article; behavioral economics; cognitive neuroscience; female; human; human experiment; prisoner dilemma; self evaluation; thinking; trust; cooperation; cultural anthropology; deception; prisoner dilemma; professional misconduct; theoretical model; Cooperative Behavior; Culture; Deception; Humans; Models, Theoretical; Prisoner Dilemma; Professional Misconduct |
Año: | 2018
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Volumen: | 115
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Número: | 35
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Página de inicio: | 8728
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Página de fin: | 8733
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DOI: |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1803438115 |
Título revista: | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
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Título revista abreviado: | Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.
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ISSN: | 00278424
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CODEN: | PNASA
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Registro: | https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_00278424_v115_n35_p8728_Babino |
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Citas:
---------- APA ----------
Babino, A., Makse, H.A., DiTella, R. & Sigman, M.
(2018)
. Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 115(35), 8728-8733.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1803438115---------- CHICAGO ----------
Babino, A., Makse, H.A., DiTella, R., Sigman, M.
"Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception"
. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 115, no. 35
(2018) : 8728-8733.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1803438115---------- MLA ----------
Babino, A., Makse, H.A., DiTella, R., Sigman, M.
"Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception"
. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 115, no. 35, 2018, pp. 8728-8733.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1803438115---------- VANCOUVER ----------
Babino, A., Makse, H.A., DiTella, R., Sigman, M. Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2018;115(35):8728-8733.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1803438115