Artículo

Estamos trabajando para incorporar este artículo al repositorio
Consulte el artículo en la página del editor
Consulte la política de Acceso Abierto del editor

Abstract:

We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83).

Registro:

Documento: Artículo
Título:Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism
Autor:Di Tella, R.; Perez-Truglia, R.; Babino, A.; Sigman, M.
Filiación:Harvard Business School, Morgan Hall 283, 15 Harvard Way, Boston, MA 02163, United States
Microsoft Research, New England Research and Development (NERD) Lab, Office 12073, 1 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142, United States
Departamento de Física, UBA, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, C.P. 1426, Caldas, 1700 3, Argentina
Departamento de Física, FCEN, UBA, IFIBA, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Almirante Juan Saenz Valiente 1010, Buenos Aires, C1428BIJ, Argentina
Año:2015
Volumen:105
Número:11
Página de inicio:3416
Página de fin:3442
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409
Título revista:American Economic Review
Título revista abreviado:Am. Econ. Rev.
ISSN:00028282
Registro:https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_00028282_v105_n11_p3416_DiTella

Referencias:

  • Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., Renner, E., An experimental bribery game (2002) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18 (2), pp. 428-454
  • Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., Shleifer, A., Regulation and distrust (2010) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125 (3), pp. 1015-1049
  • Akerlof, G.A., Dickens, W.T., The economic consequences of cognitive dissonance (1982) American Economic Review, 72 (3), pp. 307-319
  • Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E., Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities (2005) Journal of Public Economics, 89 (5-6), pp. 897-931
  • Alesina, A., Glaeser, E.L., (2004) Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference, , Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • Andreoni, J., Douglas Bernheim, B., Social image and the fifty-fifty norm: A theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects (2009) Econometrica, 77 (5), pp. 1607-1636
  • Andreoni, J., Sanchez, A., (2014) Do Beliefs Justify Actions or do Actions Justify Beliefs? An Experiment on Stated Beliefs, Revealed Beliefs, and Social-image Manipulation, , National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
  • Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G., Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of self-serving biases (1997) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (1), pp. 109-126
  • Babcock, L., Wang, X., Loewenstein, G., Choosing the wrong pond: Social comparisons in negotiations that reflect a self-serving bias (1996) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1), pp. 1-19
  • Bellemare, C., Kroger, S., Van Soest, A., Preferences, intentions, and expectation violations: A large-scale experiment with a representative subject pool (2011) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 78 (3), pp. 349-365
  • Bénabou, R., Ideology: Joseph Schumpeter lecture (2008) Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (2-3), pp. 321-352
  • Bénabou, R., Tirole, J., Belief in a just world and redistributive politics (2006) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (2), pp. 699-746
  • Ben-Ner, A., Putterman, L., Magen, D., Kong, F., Reciprocity in a two-part dictator game (2004) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53 (3), pp. 333-352
  • Benoit, J.-P., Dubra, J., Apparent overconfidence (2011) Econometrica, 79 (5), pp. 1591-1625
  • Berg, J., Dickhaut, J.W., McCabe, K.A., Trust, reciprocity, and social history (1995) Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (1), pp. 122-142
  • Bisin, A., Verdier, T., A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology (2000) European Journal of Political Economy, 16 (1), pp. 5-29
  • Blount, S., When social outcomes aren't fair: The effect of causal attributions on preferences (1995) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63 (2), pp. 131-144
  • Bolton, G.E., Katok, E., Zwick, R., Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness (1998) International Journal of Game Theory, 27 (2), pp. 269-299
  • Bolton, G.E., Ockenfels, A., ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition (2000) American Economic Review, 90 (1), pp. 166-193
  • Bowles, S., Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions (1998) Journal of Economic Literature, 36 (1), pp. 75-111
  • Brunnermeier, M.K., Parker, J.A., Optimal expectations (2005) American Economic Review, 95 (4), pp. 1092-1118
  • Caplin, A., Leahy, J., Psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory feelings (2001) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (1), pp. 55-79
  • Cappelen, A.W., Hole, A.D., Sorensen, E.Ø., Tungodden, B., The pluralism of fairness ideals: An experimental approach (2007) American Economic Review, 97 (3), pp. 818-827
  • Cherry, T.L., Frykblom, P., Shogren, J.F., Hardnose the dictator (2002) American Economic Review, 92 (4), pp. 1218-1221
  • Compte, O., Postlewaite, A., Confidence-enhanced performance (2004) American Economic Review, 94 (5), pp. 1536-1557
  • Corneo, G., Gruner, H.P., Individual preferences for political redistribution (2002) Journal of Public Economics, 83 (1), pp. 83-107
  • Cruces, G., Perez-Truglia, R., Tetaz, M., Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment (2013) Journal of Public Economics, 98, pp. 100-112
  • Dahl, G.B., Ransom, M.R., Does where you stand depend on where you sit? Tithing donations and self-serving beliefs (1999) American Economic Review, 89 (4), pp. 703-727
  • Bó, D., Pedro, A.F., Putterman, L., Institutions and behavior: Experimental evidence on the effects of democracy (2010) American Economic Review, 100 (5), pp. 2205-2229
  • Dana, J., Cain, D.M., Dawes, R.M., What you don't know won't hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games (2006) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100 (2), pp. 193-201
  • Dana, J., Weber, R.A., Kuang, J.X., Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness (2007) Economic Theory, 33 (1), pp. 67-80
  • DellaVigna, S., List, J.A., Malmendier, U., Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving (2012) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (1), pp. 1-56
  • Denzau, A.T., North, D.C., Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions (1994) Kyklos, 47 (1), pp. 3-31
  • Di Tella, R., Galiani, S., Schargrodsky, E., The formation of beliefs: Evidence from the allocation of land titles to squatters (2007) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (1), pp. 209-241
  • Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R., Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? (2009) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 285-321. , Spring
  • Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., (2010) Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs About Others, , National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
  • Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., Babino, A., Sigman, M., Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism: Dataset (2015) American Economic Review, , http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409
  • Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J.A., Holzberg, A.D., Ambiguity and self-evaluation: The role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability (1989) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57 (6), pp. 1082-1090
  • Dusek, L., Ortmann, A., Lízal, L., Understanding corruption through experiments: A primer (2004) CERGE-EI Discussion Paper
  • Falk, A., Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., Testing theories of fairness: Intentions matter (2008) Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (1), pp. 287-303
  • Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M., A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation (1999) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (3), pp. 817-868
  • Festinger, L., (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, , Stanford: Stanford University Press
  • Fischbacher, U., Z-tree: Toolbox for ready-made economic experiments (1999) IEW Working Paper
  • Fong, C., Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution (2001) Journal of Public Economics, 82 (2), pp. 225-246
  • Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J.L., Savin, N.E., Sefton, M., Fairness in simple bargaining experiments (1994) Games and Economic Behavior, 6 (3), pp. 347-369
  • Giuliano, P., Living arrangements in western Europe: Does cultural origin matter? (2007) Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (5), pp. 927-952
  • Giuliano, P., Spilimbergo, A., Growing up in a recession (2014) Review of Economic Studies, 81 (2), pp. 787-817
  • Haisley, E.C., Weber, R.A., Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior (2010) Games and Economic Behavior, 68 (2), pp. 614-625
  • Hamman, J.R., Loewenstein, G., Weber, R.A., Self-interest through delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship (2010) American Economic Review, 100 (4), pp. 1826-1846
  • Hastorf, A.H., Cantril, H., They saw a game: A case study (1954) Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49 (1), pp. 129-134
  • Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., In search of homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies (2001) American Economic Review, 91 (2), pp. 73-78
  • Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., Smith, V., Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games (1994) Games and Economic Behavior, 7 (3), pp. 346-380
  • Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Smith, V.L., Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games (1996) American Economic Review, 86 (3), pp. 653-660
  • Hoffman, E., Spitzer, L., Entitlements, rights and fairness: An experimental examination of concepts of distributive justice (1985) Journal of Legal Studies, 14 (2), pp. 259-297
  • Hsee, C.K., Elastic justification: How unjustifable factors influence judgments (1996) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 66 (1), pp. 122-129
  • Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., Thaler, R., Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market (1986) American Economic Review, 76 (4), pp. 728-741
  • Konow, J., Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation decisions (2000) American Economic Review, 90 (4), pp. 1072-1091
  • Konow, J., Which is the fairest one of all? A positive analysis of justice theories (2003) Journal of Economic Literature, 41 (4), pp. 1188-1239
  • Konow, J., Adam Smith and the modern science of ethics (2012) Economics and Philosophy, 28 (3), pp. 333-362
  • Köszegi, B., Ego utility, overconfidence, and task choice (2006) Journal of the European Economic Association, 4 (4), pp. 673-707
  • Kuhn, A., In the eye of the beholder: Subjective inequality measures and individuals' assessment of market justice (2011) European Journal of Political Economy, 27 (4), pp. 625-641
  • Kunda, Z., The case for motivated reasoning (1990) Psychological Bulletin, 108 (3), pp. 480-498
  • Lazear, E.P., Malmendier, U., Weber, R.A., Sorting in experiments with application to social preferences (2012) American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4 (1), pp. 136-163
  • Lerner, M.J., (1982) The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion, , New York: Springer
  • Levine, D.K., Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments (1998) Review of Economic Dynamics, 1 (3), pp. 593-622
  • Malmendier, U., Te Velde, V.L., Weber, R.A., Rethinking reciprocity (2014) Annual Review of Economics, 6, pp. 849-874
  • Mobius, M., Niederle, M., Niehaus, P., Rosenblat, T., (2014) Managing Self-confidence, , Unpublished
  • Norton, M., Ariely, D., Building a better America: One wealth quintile at a time (2011) Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6 (9), pp. 9-12
  • Oberholzer-Gee, F., Eichenberger, R., Fairness in extended dictator game experiments (2008) B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 8 (1), pp. 1-21
  • Oxoby, R.J., Attitudes and allocations: Status, cognitive dissonance, and the manipulation of attitudes (2003) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 52 (3), pp. 365-385
  • Oxoby, R.J., Spraggon, J., Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games (2008) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65 (3-4), pp. 703-713
  • Piketty, T., Social mobility and redistributive politics (1995) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3), pp. 551-584
  • Rabin, M., Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics (1993) American Economic Review, 83 (5), pp. 1281-1302
  • Rabin, M., (1995) Moral Preferences, Moral Constraints, and Self-serving Biases, , University of California at Berkeley Economics Working Paper
  • Rabin, M., Schrag, J.L., First impressions matter: A model of confirmatory bias (1999) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1), pp. 37-82
  • Rotemberg, J.J., Customer anger at price increases, changes in the frequency of price adjustment and monetary policy (2005) Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 (4), pp. 829-852
  • Rotemberg, J.J., Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game (2008) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 66 (3-4), pp. 457-476
  • Rotemberg, J.J., (2014) Group Learning, Wage Dispersion, and Nonstationary Offers, , Unpublished
  • Roth, A.E., Bargaining experiments (1995) The Handbook of Experimental Economics, pp. 253-348. , edited by John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, Princeton: Princeton University Press
  • Ruffle, B.J., More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games (1998) Games and Economic Behavior, 23, pp. 247-265
  • Schweitzer, M.E., Hsee, C.K., Stretching the truth: Elastic justification and motivated communication of uncertain information (2002) Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 25 (2), pp. 185-201
  • Sharot, T., Korn, C., Dolan, R., How unrealistic optimism is maintained in the face of reality (2011) Nature Neuroscience, 14 (11), pp. 1475-1479

Citas:

---------- APA ----------
Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., Babino, A. & Sigman, M. (2015) . Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. American Economic Review, 105(11), 3416-3442.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409
---------- CHICAGO ----------
Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., Babino, A., Sigman, M. "Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism" . American Economic Review 105, no. 11 (2015) : 3416-3442.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409
---------- MLA ----------
Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., Babino, A., Sigman, M. "Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism" . American Economic Review, vol. 105, no. 11, 2015, pp. 3416-3442.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409
---------- VANCOUVER ----------
Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., Babino, A., Sigman, M. Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. Am. Econ. Rev. 2015;105(11):3416-3442.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409